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The Role of Basic Values in the Contemporary
Constitutional Hermeneutics
of Germany and the United States
William Joseph Wagnee
The idea of a written constitution promises that respect for a para-
mount text can place state power in the service of political and human
values, which experience shows to be essential to society&apos;s happiness and
good order. Constitutionalism&apos;s value lies in the basic ends it advances.
Nations with less sanguine prospects contemplate with envy the relative
stability, prosperity, and freedom of the German and American constitu-
tional systems. Looking beyond the obvious, threshold significance of
fidelity to the constitutional text, one is stimulated to ponder the more
comprehensive schemes of basic value these two systems offer as internal
measures of their justification.
While it is fair to conclude that the two constitutions - German and
American - advance kindred political and human values, it is also inescap-
able that they do so in different ways. The differences, both conceptual
and practical, reflect differing legal cultures, disparate historical experi-
ence, and even substantively diverging visions of the ideal human society.
A dialectic of contrast challenges each system to discover its stengths and
weaknesses, as well as the distinctive challenges lying before it in a rno-
ment of far-reaching and rapid political, social, and economic change.
* Assoc. Prof. of Law at The Catholic University of America, Washington D.C. This
article is based on a revised version of the text of the Columbus Day Lecture of the North
America Program of the University of Bonn, which the author delivered in Bonn on
October 12, 1995. The article was written as Guest Research Fellow in residence at the Max
Planck Institut far auslandisches bffentliches Recht und Vi5lkerrecht in Heidelberg with the
support of a senior research grant from the Fulbright Kommission, 1995 - 96.
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This article seeks to advance this dialectic by exploring two recurring
themes in the interpretive work of the high courts charged with reviewing
constitutional issues in the two countries. One theme which it will ad-
dress for this purpose is the role of basic values in determining the scope
and structure of governmental power, specifically that of the federal legis-
lature. The other is the role they have in resolving conflicts between indi-
vidual dissent and legislative decision over &quot;public morality,&quot; in particu-
lar, the public regulation of abortion. Both themes recommend themselves
for use in the present context, because central to the recent jurisprudence
of the two courts; the focus of controversies in both countries over the
value-basis of constitutional order; and, by nature, in any case suited to
fruitful theoretical reflection on the role of basic values in constitutional
adjudication.
The German Constitutional Court&apos;s Maastricht Treaty judgement of
October 12, 1993 on the scope of parliamentary power to cede authority
to the European Union,1 a German question arising in the relatively
recent past, lends itself to comparative analysis in connection with the
first theme, when placed in profile against the American Supreme Court&apos;s
decision in United States v. Lopez of April 26, 1995 on the scope of
2Congress&apos;s power over state-level affairs, a longerstanding American
problem. The German Court&apos;s Second Abortion decision, of May 2, 1992,3
forms the obvious choice for a study of the second theme, as compared
to the American Court&apos;s holding in Casey v. Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania, decided June 29, 1992.4
A theoretical statement of the role of basic values in constitutional
interpretation within the two systems offers a preliminary foundation for
exploring the meaning of the cases. Clarification of the meaning of the
cases, in turn, prepares the ground for some conclusions about the specific
lessons of contemporary comparative analysis for American and German
constitutionaliSM.5
1 BVerfGE 89,155, 11.
2 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995).
3 BVerfGE 88, 203, IL
4 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992). The treatment of abortion has
been found a useful point of reference in recent comparisons of German and American
legal systems. See, e.g., Mary Ann G I e n d o n, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law
(1987); Donald P. K o mm e r s, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: Should
Americans Pay Attention?, 10 journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 1 (1994).
5 Both German and American legal systems are sufficiently pluralistic that many aspects
of the judicial decisions considered in the course of this article could conceivably have been
decided differently - in some cases, in fact, they could even have resembled holdings which
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L The Role of BasIC Values in the German
and American Constitutional Frameworks
A theoretical statement of the role of basic values in a given system of
constitutional interpretation calls for attention to the place of basic values
in the constitutional text; the methodology which the Court charged with
finally adjudicating constitutional disputes applies in interpreting the text;
and the ontological, societal, or political terms in which that Court envi-
sions basic values as being concretely realized through its adjudications.
In the German system, the constitutional text presents a detailed array
of values, which it propounds as corresponding to an objective moral or-
der.6 The value of the dignity of the human person forms the text&apos;s leit-
Motif.7 This dignity is represented as flowing from the inherent status of
persons as beings whose fulfillment lies in self-realization through auton-
omous moral choice, political participation, and social solidarity.8
The part of individual dignity lying in autonomous self-realization is
expressed principally through the concept of basic rights.9 The portion
found in political participation is communicated primarily through that of
militant democracy.10 The aspect equated with social solidarity is honored
the article treats as cross-cultural counterpositions. The article does not assume that some
kind of immanent historical necessity required the holdings to turn out as they did, but it
does presuppose that law has a historical character ensuring that as long as Germany and
America continue to represent separate legal cultures, as they do at present, even reversals
bringing with them new similarities, will take on coloration from deeper orientations to
concepts and values keeping the meaning of outcomes distinguishable. Compare Fr. C. v.
S a v i g n y, System des heutigen R6mischen Rechts, 212 passim (Berlin 1840).
6 Konrad H e s s e, Grundziige des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
118
-19, 124 - 27 (19th ed. 1993). The degree to which judges are competent creatively to
interpret the content of these rights in changing circumstances is contested. Donald
P. K o in in e r s, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 Emory Law Journal 837,
859 - 61 (1991).
7 Grundgesetz Art. 1 Abs. 1; Klaus S t e r n, Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität
der Grundrechte, in: Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof [eds.], 5 Handbuch des Staatsrechts
4-8(1992).
8 Peter H ä b e r 1 e, Die Menschenwürde als Grundlage der staatlichen Gemeinschaft, in:
Isensee/Kirchhof (note 7) 828 - 33 (1987).
9 Grundgesetz Art. 1-19; more precisely, the relevant concept is one of the &quot;subjective&quot;
exercise of rights, &quot;als subjekte, statusbegriindende Rechte sind die Grundrechte v e r f a s -
sungsrechtliche Fundamentalrechte des Einzelnen als Mensch und als Bürger&quot;,
Hesse (note 6), at 121.
10 Grundgesetz Art. 20 Abs. 4, 21 and 38. See generally Eckhard J e s s e, Streitbare
Demokratie (1980).
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under the rubric of the social state.1 1 The value of law as an inherently ap-
propriate means of supporting all of these values is expressed in the con-
cept of the rule of law.12 The particular channels and prerogatives of
power the text lays out, whether relating to separation of powers, feder-
alism, or the individual standing to assert constitutional claims, are offered
as deriving essential meaning in relation to this same scheme of values
centered on the dignity of the human person.13
The German Constitutional Court&apos;s methodology for adjudicating con-
stitutional disputes assumes that material conflicts arising in changing cir-
cumstances allow the specification of the concrete content of the basic val-
ues which are given as first principles with the text. Specific disputes are
acknowledged as capable of implicating more than one basic value, but the
Court assumes that principles also exist for allocating concrete burdens
towards their resolution, to ensure that the core meaning of all implicated
values can be vindicated in every circumstance with no essential qualifica-
14tion.
Based on confidence in the essential unity and knowability of an objec-
tive moral order existing beyond the constitutional text, and amenable to
concrete realization through law, the Court aims, in each case before it, to
contribute to a more general statement of concrete rights and duties satis-
fying the demands of the constitutional scheme of values. Cumulatively,
the Court aims at a comprehensive and coherent conceptualization of the
fullest implications of the constitutional value order in relation to all con-
figurations of fact yet within its notice. This textually grounded concept
of the Court&apos;s task explains, for example, the Court&apos;s issuance of decisions
over abstract issues outside of &quot;the concrete case or controversy&quot; require-
11 Grundgesetz Art. 20 Abs. I and Art. 28 Abs. 1; Ekkehart S t e i n, Staatsrecht 170 -178
(14th ed. 1993).
12 Grundgesetz Art. 20 Abs. 3; Volkmar G 6 t z, Legislative and Executive Power under
the Constitutional Requirements entailed in the Principle of the Rule of Law, in: Christian
Starck [ed.], New Challenges to the German Basic Law (1991), 141-166.
13 E.g., Grundgesetz Art. 30, 31, 33, 38, 50, 54 &amp; 93. &quot;Die verfassungsrechtfiche
Betrachtung karm rucht an einen &apos;vorverfassungsmAigen&apos; Bundesstaatsbegriff anknilpfen.
Eine solche Ankniipfung ist ihr um so mehr verwehrt, als der fiir sie maggebliche Begriff
des Bundesstaates em normativer Begriff ist&quot;, H e s s e (note 6), at 89.
14 The German constitutional tradition is one &quot;in which freedom tends to be seen not
as the polar oppposite of community, but as a value that must be achieved in synthesis
within community&quot;. W. Cole Durham, General Assessment of the Basic Law - An
American View, in Kommers, Donald P. and Kirchhof, Paul (eds.), Germany and Its Basic
Law 45 (1993); see also S tei n (note 11), at 230 - 233, and H es s e (note 6), at 129 -138.
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ment bounding the American Supreme Court&apos;s judicial power, in what is
termed abstrakte Normenkontrolle.15
As the realization of value occurring through its adjudicative activity,
the Court envisions the actual flourishing of individual human personal-
ity in a context of embodied social and political accountability.16 It con-
siders its adjudication to effectuate that flourishing, not only through its
coherent articulation and concrete enforcement of constitutional rights
and duties, but also by the common moral interpretation of changing cir-
cumstances and the more effective avenues of political decision and gov-
ernmental administration, which it offers to guide general societal cooper-
ation for the common good.
In the American scheme, the written constitution and its key amend-
ments establish a different emphasis. The text expresses the values of a -
more or less - utilitarian notion of welfare; fairness; and individual liberty,
conceived as freedom from governmental intrusion. The substantive con-
tent of the powers enumerated for Congress in Article 1,17 the aptness of
the presidency for executing laws and policies set out in Article 11,18 and
the basis for a unitary jurisprudence established by provision for a Su-
preme Court in Article III all express utility.19 The principle of majority
rule of Article 1,20 the procedural protections in the Bill of RightS,21 and
the equal protection and due process guarantees of the XIV Amendment22
communicate fairness. The separation and division of powers concepts of
15 Grundgesetz Art. 93 Abs. 1- 3; Klaus S c h 1 a i c h, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht
77 - 82 (2d ed. 1991).
16 &quot;In the reality of its constitutional life,&quot; Germany is &quot;a state which has taken
seriously its obligation to create favorable external conditions for its citizens to achieve a
life inconformity with human dignity.&quot; KurtSontheimer, Principles of HumanDignity
in the Federal Republic, in: Kommers/Kirchhof (note 14), at 216.
17 U.S. Const. art. 1, 5 8.
18 U.S. Const. art. II.
19 U.S. Const. art. 111, 5 1. Winfried B r u g g e r observes that the classical utilitarianism
of Jeremy B e n t h a in reflects the kind of ideas which historically influenced the develop-
ment of the American system, along with related strands in Adam S rn i t h and John
L o c k e. Winfried B ru g g e r, Grundrechte und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in den Verei-
nigten Staaten von Amerika 421- 22 (1987).
20 U.S. Const. art. 1, 55 2, 3 &amp; 5.
21 E.g., U.S. Const. amend. IV, V, VI, VII, &amp; VIII.
22 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 1. On fairness as a basic constitutional value in the United
States, see John Hart E I y, Democracy and Distrust 135 - 79 (1980).
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the body of the Constitution,23 along with the Bill of Rights&apos;s civil liber-
ties, are meant to serve individual liberty.24
The interpretive methodology of the American Supreme Court is
oriented to refereeing power in shifting circumstances to ensure these
same basic values of governmental efficiency, fairness, and individual au-
tonomy. Where conflicts arise between the first and third goals, the Court
generally gives concrete priority to individual autonomy, except where
concerns relating to utility reach an intensity considered compelling.25
Guided by a skeptical moral and political epistemology, the Court pre-
fers plural and conflicting justifications for many of its concrete holdings.
It relies on the stability of precedent and the practical success of govern-
ment, more than on common appropriation of abstract concepts or mean-
ings, to validate its work.26 Where the Court&apos;s members offer more theo-
retical justifications of their decisions, they tend to ground them in the in-
tention of the founderS27 or on the formal scope of isolated conceptS,28
rather than more substantive or systematic notions of value.
23 Elements include bicameralism and presidential veto, U.S. Const. art. 1, 5 7; the
separation of federal powers, art. 1, 11, &amp; III; and the division of state and federal power,
amend. X. James M a d i s o n alluded to this core value of the separation of governmental
powers, when he stated: &quot;The accumulation of all powers, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced, the very definition of tyranny&quot;, Max Beloff [ed.], The Federalist No. XLVIII
245 - 46 (2d ed. 1987).
24 U.S. Const. amend. I-X.
25 In this process, the Court both identifies individual interests constituting protectible
liberties and governmental interests compelling enough sometimes to outweigh them.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S. Ct. 193, 194, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944). By
default, justice S t o n e&apos;s footnote 4 in the case of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778, 783 - 84 n.4, 82 L. Ed. 1234 (1938), generally is taken
as a schema of the diverse ways in which individual rights may take priority over majori-
tarian decision. For contemporary interpretations, see David L. F a i g in a n, Reconciling
Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court
Practice, 78 Virginia Law Review 1521 (1992), and T. Alexander A I e i n i k o f f, Constitu-
tional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale Law journal 943 (1987).
26 Winfried B r u g g e r expresses this point as follows: &quot;e in p 1 r i s c h hangt viel von der
Frage ab, ob von der judikative, der Exekutive oder der Legislative mehr Tyrannei oder
Machtmißbrauch zu erwarten ist. Solche streitigen und nach historischer Lage wechselnden
Urteile bestimmen auch das Verständnis institutioneller Kompetenzen&quot;, B r u g g e r (note
19), at 355.
27 A position advanced in a well known form by Robert H. B or k, The Tempting of
America (1990).
28 justice B I a c k offers perhaps the clearest case, assuming that the conceptual content
of the text is self-interpreting. See, e.g., Youngstown Sbeet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343
U.S. 579, 582, 72 S. Ct. 863, 864, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952) and Hugo L. B I a c k, A Constitu-
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As the social and political outcome of its adjudication, the Court ex-
pects a plenum of individual decisions free of governmental interference,
and a flourishing of social, commercial, and political exchange satisfying
popular preferences. The Court&apos;s tools to these ends include the guaran-
tee of a plurality of governmental powers, but also of moral and religious
societal perspectives;29 a common language of utility; and governmental
organs functioning sufficiently well to be practically effective, but suffi-
ciently uncertain in scope to threaten no definitive substitution of the
decisions of the collective will for those of autonomous individuals or the
associations they freely form.
From a comparative perspective, the German constitutional scheme af-
firms basic values as inherently worthwhile moral ends, while the Ameri-
can scheme treats them as the functional requisites of the freedom and
wealth believed to be conducive to an individualized pursuit of happiness.
Germany ordains constitutional interpretation to the discovery of the
meaning of concrete situations for a project of common governmental and
societal cooperation towards realizing objective values. America directs it
to finding the material opportunities in changing circumstances for
society and individuals alike to multiply wealth and to realize the diverse
projects of the individual imagination.
A comparison of the cases selected treating the scope of national legis-
lative power and the regulation of public morality will serve to test and
confirm the validity of this account, identify its implications for the treat-
ment of concrete issues of contemporary import in the two systems, and
permit a more informed judgment about stress and opportunity currently
before each.
tional Faith (1968), but so-called the derivation of extratextual meaning in relation to the
fourteenth amendment concept of liberty by a Justice Douglas or Brennan in the
context of the &quot;new substantive due process&quot; also reflects reliance on isolated concepts. The
approach of justice D o u g I a s or B r e n n a n differs from that of Justice B I a c k merely by
acknowledging that the meaning attributed to such concepts does not reside in the text as
such. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1679, 14 L.
Ed. 2d 510 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1031, 31 L.
Ed. 2d 349 (1972).
29 This jurisprudence finds a focus in both the establishment and free exercise clauses of
the first amendment. Its central idea was given classic expression by justice Jackson: &quot;If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.&quot; West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1187, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943).
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IL The Constitutional Scope of Federal LegislatiVe Power
The exercise of governmental power is not taken for granted under a
constitution, but requires justification. Recognized forms of such justifi-
cation in both Germany and America appeal to basic values, although
these may be given statement variously as substantive underlying pur-
poses or reasons for the differential allocation of governmental power. Be-
cause the legislative branch originates new law and the national legislature
has global impact, the scope of national legislative power has special im-
portance for the meaning of basic constitutional values in both systems.
The German Experience
In its 1993 Maastricbt Treaty judgment on Germany&apos;s accession to the
European Union, the German Constitutional Court ruled on the scope of
federal parliamentary power. In so doing, it fashioned a unique opportu-
nity for practical insight into how contemporary Germany justifies na-
tional legislative power in relation to basic constitutional values.
To reach its judgement in the case, the Court treated federal parliamen-
tary power, both with respect to internal scope and external limitation by
other elements of governmental structure, as a matter, not so much of pos-
itive constitutional provision, as of basic constitutional value. The Court&apos;s
chosen point of departure was the value of democracy, more specifically,
democracy from the angle of the individual&apos;s right to participate in legis-
lative decisionmaking through meaningful representation.30 The Court
interpreted the Federal Parliament&apos;s delegation of aspects of its authority
to the European Union as implicating this value.
-
It found Parliament&apos;s enactment compatible with the individual
German&apos;s right to participate in democracy and, thus, to be constitutional,
on the grounds that the delegation had been defined with sufficient speci-
ficity to reserve essential democratic decisionmaking to the national leg-
islative body,31 and that the supranational body on which authority was
conferred advanced democracy, commensurate with the scope of the del-
egation.32
The Court recognized the rule of law as a second implicated value. The
issue was whether a body standing outside the German framework of law
30 BVerfGE 89, 155, H (171).
31 Id. at 18 1.
32 Id.
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as such, could be eligible to bear the values constituting the constitutional
order.33 Neither the openness of the Basic Law through its original Pre-
amble and Articles to the transfer of authority to supranational bodies,34
nor the later amendment of the Basic Law expressly to permit Germany&apos;s
accession to the European Union was found by the Court to resolve the
question.35 Parliament&apos;s act of accession was upheld as constitutional, but
only because the Court specifically found it compatible with the struc-
tural legal integrity of German constitutionalism, considered as a basic
value.
To reach its conclusion that accession did not threaten the rule of law
as a value constitutive of the German constitutional order, the Court con-
strued the delegation of power occurring under the Maastricht Treaty nar-
rowly, holding that it permitted termination of membership by legislative
act of member states, with at least studied ambiguity about whether such
termination could be effectuated by the German Parliament acting unilat-
erally;36 that the implementation of acts of the Union violative of the con-
crete order of basic values in Germany could be annulled by itself;37 and
that the Union lacked power to reach either original, nondelegated dem-
ocratic judgements affecting Germany,38 or to allocate, in any definitive
way, jurisdictional competences between itself and Germany or other
member states.39
In reaching these conclusions, the Court did more than merely confirm
the scope of German legislative power within some existing allocation of
power. It interpreted the Treaty as well as the German Basic Law, to ar-
rive at an original account of the entire supranational framework of power
within which German legislative power would fit, assuming due respect
for German constitutional principles. An opinion, purporting on its face
to clarify the nature of a national &quot;part&quot; of European integration, in fact
addressed the shape of the supranational &quot;whole&quot;.
Significantly, the Court accomplished this constructive effort, only by
sidestepping the issue of whether moments of constitutional decision
33 Id. at 188.
34 Grundgesetz Priambel and Art. 24 Abs. 1.
35 Grundgesetz Art. 23 Abs. 1.
36 BVerfGE 89, 155, Il (190, 207).
37 Id. at 174 -175, 178; the opinion continues a discussion on this point which the
Constitutional Court commenced in its decisions in Solange I, BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974), and
Solange H, BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986).
38 Id. at 191-192.
39 Id. at 197.
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might not arise giving democracy precedence over the ordinary rule of
law, so that constitutional judgements over the shape of the &quot;whole&quot;
might be placed beyond its own purvieW.40 The Court&apos;s evasion cannot be
taken to imply insistence that consent to constitutional change need al-
ways occur through pre-existing legal channels, for the &quot;consent&quot; giving
the Basic Law,its own legitimacy has never been given by any established
form of plebiscite, or the like.41 Germany&apos;s own experience argues, in fact,
for the derivation of constitutional authority from the customary obser-
vance, over time, of overarching legal form.
It would be error, as well, to interpret the Court&apos;s choice of not
acknowledging the possibility that democracy, under some circumstances,
preempts the ordinary rule of law in a process of gradual, not less than
radical revolution, as constituting a reactionary political intervention on
behalf of the German Mark or the country&apos;s &quot;biirgerlichen Wohlstand.&quot;
The Court&apos;s decision rests neither on positivistic regard for existing Ger-
man constitutional form, nor power-political regard for Germany&apos;s mate-
rial interests, but on its evaluation of the ripeness of a European constitu-
tional moment for realizing objective constitutional values. Its elevation
of rule of law considerations represent its prudential regard, informed by
historical memory, for the seriousness of galloping inflation&apos;s threat to
constitutionalism.
The recognition that lies at the opinion&apos;s heart that fidelity to the rule
of law may impose requirements on the mode in which democratic - even
constitutional - consent is expressed, finds its true ground in the Court&apos;s
prudential judgement of the meaning of contemporary circumstances for
the perpetuation, not of either democracy or the rule of law alone, but
inclusive of all the values of the constitutional order. The Court reasoned,
in effect, that democracy&apos;s expression as a value must be pursued w i t h i n
existing legal categories, until conditions ensure that entry, whether for-
mal or informal, into a different constitutional order has, not only the suf-
ficient popular consent to validate the value of democracy as such, but, in
40 The Court does not openly acknowledge another side to the &quot;dynamism&quot; that it ad-
mits shapes the European Union&apos;s self-concept, id. at 184, and asserts merely that the dem-
ocratic impulse must be channelled in the European context through national parliaments,
since the national legislatures are the &quot;masters of the Treaty&quot;, id. at 185.
41 Klaus S t e r n, General Assessment of the Basic Law - a German View, in: Kom-
mers/Kirchhof (note 14), at 20; it has been pointed out that a &quot;Volksabstimmung&quot; in the
context of the reunification of Germany could have created the impression of a &quot;Legitima-
tionsdefizit&quot; in the German &quot;Grundgesetz&quot;, Matthias Herdegen, Die Verfassungs-
Hnderungen im Einigungsvertrag 32 (1991).
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fact, sufficiently safeguards the whole objective constellation of values of
the constitutional order.42
The nature of the prudential judgement underlying the opinion has im-
portant ramifications for the meaning of the specific structures the Court
outlines allocating power between the European Union and the organs of
German constitutional government. Descriptive and evaluative criteria for
understanding and evaluating these proposals must, namely, be formu-
lated with due regard for the distinctive interpretive role which this
prudential judgement brings to expression. American notions of longterm
pragmatic workability would clearly be misplaced if applied as a criterion
for understanding or evaluating the German Court&apos;s proposals.
The Court&apos;s role, which the prudential judgement in the case exempli-
fies, Is one of contributing to a common societal appropriation of basic
values through reason and responsible moral decision that transcends any
purely formal allocation of jurisdiction. This role is incompatible with
permanent service as the gatekeeper over the power to advance intereStS.43
Although questions of value and authority unavoidably blur with those of
power and interest in discussions of national sovereignty, the former and
not the latter form the German Court&apos;s ultimate frame of reference.
A correlary of the tenet of the objectivity of basic values characterizing
German constitutionalism is the universal accessibility of such values to
reasonable appropriation. The model within which the Court sets forth
its structural analysis in the opinion is thus one ultimately oriented to
common cooperation for the good, based in reason, not a final allocation
of jurisdictional competencies, even that framed by current constitutional
law itself. The Court knows itself to be taking part in a cooperative
dialogue for the common good, already occurring, in fact, if not yet law,
on the supranational level. Rather than to stake out a permanent role for
itself as the gatekeeper of power, the Court means to invite a transforma-
tion, if possible, of the relevant factual premises of discussion, through an
42 The constitutional provision most closely linked to the Court&apos;s mandate in this regard
is the so-called &quot;eternity clause&quot; of Art. 79 Abs. 3. As illustrated in this case, the Court&apos;s
function in this regard is, notwithstanding its positive proposals, more fundamentally, a
negative one: &quot;The judgment leaves the discussion on the constitutional limits of further
European integration beyond Maastricht entirely open&quot;, Matthias H e r d e g e n, Maastricht
and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints for an &quot;Ever Closer
Union&quot;, 31 Common Market Law Review 235, 249 (1994).
43 The role the Court claims for itself both with respect to passing on basic rights ques-
tions and delegations of legislative authority creates this appearance. BVerfGE 89, 155 11,
(174 - 75, 178, 190, 207).
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ongoing gradual concrete realization of basic values foreseeably bringing
with it the obsolescence of its specific allocation of competencies, but not
its basic methodology.
The American Experience
The American holding on national legislative power which is nearest to
the Maastricht Treaty case in its contemporary comparative significance is
United States v. Lopez, which the United States Supreme Court decided
this past April. The context - the inverse of the German holding&apos;s in two
respects - was the relationship of central to regional power, at a time long
subsequent to, rather than immediately before, the adoption of a plan of
political integration. While Germans show little desire broadly to import
American federalistic structures to Europe, the problem of allocating au-
thority between the central and regional government arising for the
American Court in Lopez, nonetheless, bears instructive parallels and
contrasts to the Maastricht Treaty case&apos;s distribution of legislative power.
The concrete issue in Lopez was whether the scope of congressional
legislative power could justify the federal enactment of a &quot;Gun-free
School Zones Act,44 criminalizing the possession of a firearm at local
schools. The &quot;first principle&quot; from which Chief Justice Rehnquist de-
veloped his opinion in support of the holding was the idea of limited gov-
ernmental power. This he derived from the concept of enumerated pow-
ers found in Article I of the Constitution.45 This concept is generally
given at least lip service as an axiom that Congress has no general legisla-
tive, welfare, or &quot;police&quot; authority, but only specific grants of power.
R e h n q u i s t made it clear that the majority on the Court was prepared
to put teeth back in the axiom. He grounded the value of the principle, in
turn, in its importance for the preservation of &quot;fundamental liberties.1146
Congress had proposed its enactment under the Commerce Clause of
Article 1, empowering it to &quot;regulate commerce among the several
states.&quot; Taking with renewed seriousness the idea that the premise of lim-
ited government restricted Congress&apos;s ends to specifically enumerated
powers, the majority, for whom Rehnquist spoke, found itself obli-
44 18 U.S.C. S 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
45 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 633 (1995). At the time of the writing of this
article, the official United States Reports version of the opinion was not yet available to the
author and so pinpoint citations to that source are not provided.
46 Id.
13 Za6RV 56/1-2
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gated to decide whether the private deployment of firearms at local
schools was, without more, &quot;commerce among the several states.,,47
To resolve the issue, Rehnquist&apos;s opinion adopted, as its starting
point, the assumption that the clause had so to be interpreted that mean-
ingful limits demonstrably appeared along with any concrete power re-
cognized.48 Rehnquist scrutinized the adequacy of the Court&apos;s prior
rulings on the clause&apos;s scope in this light. Those rulings supplied a defer-
ential rule of interpretation, treating &quot;commerce among the several
states&quot; as encompassing any activity &quot;substantially affecting&quot; com-
merce among the states which Congress wished to treat as commerce,
with the paradigm of commerce being (as justice T h o m a s emphasized
in his concurrence) buying and selling or transport for purchase and
sale.49
The Court in Lopez held that the premise of limited power required an
adjustment in the inherited interpretive rule, which was so open-textured,
as to entail no restriction on the scope of power being concretely recog-
nized.50 To arrive at a new, constitutionally adequate rule, Rehnquist
explained that the majority found it necessary to add, as a more specific
condition, the requirement that &quot;commerce among the several states&quot;
be read thenceforth to mean only commercial activities, i.e. buying
and selling or transportation for purchase and sale, substantially affecting
commerce interstate.51 The new rule supported continued reliance on
substantial indirect effect to satisfy the textual requirement that a regu-
lated activity be &quot;among the several states,&quot; or &quot;interstate&quot;, but no
longer the textual requirement that it be &quot;commerce&quot;. The Court held
that Congress&apos;s &quot;Gun-free School Zones Act&quot; was a constitutionally inad-
missable arrogation of power, because the introduction by teenagers of
guns into schools, for whatever indirect impacts on the national economy,
was not itself economic or commercial in nature.52
The considerable significance commentators already ascribe to Lopez
reflects the holding&apos;s departure from nearly sixty years of precedent under-
47 Id.
48 The court reviewed the history of its decisions to show that &quot;limitations on the com-
merce power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause.&quot; 15 S. Ct. at 1627,
131 L. Ed. 2d at 633.
49 115 S. Ct. at 1630, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 638; and 115 S. Ct. at 1643, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 655
(T h om as, J., concurring).
50 115 S. Ct. at 1633, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 642.
51 115 S. Ct. at 1634, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 643.
52 Id.
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girding Congress&apos;s role in Franklin D. Roosevelt&apos;s New Deal, the Civil
Rights Movement, and America&apos;s adoption of the welfare state. The change
Lopez effects in the allocation of legislative power within the American
federal system does not appear on the opinion&apos;s face, however, but only in
relation to the larger body of American constitutional case law.
To grasp the exact nature of the change, one must first understand what
the holding leaves unaltered. Even after Lopez, Congress retains powerful
and wide-ranging legislative authority under a line of Supreme Court
cases going back to Chief Justice John Marshall&apos;s 1819 opinion in
McCullocb v. Maryland.53 Based on this precedent, Congress is still to be
viewed as enjoying its authority by direct constitutional grant from the
people, not state delegation, and its enumerated powers are still to be lib-
erally construed as implying all secondary powers useful to their accom-
plishment.
Other precedent surviving Lopez ensures that the Commerce Clause
itself alots Congress the power to regulate any conduct, for any congres-
sional motive, solely on condition that the conduct have an immediate
commercial dimension. Lopez does not disturb precedent permitting
Congress to prohibit racial discrimination on moral grounds, only on
condition that the discrimination regulated occurs in the course of eco-
nomic activity.54 Congress may likewise continue to restrict extortionist
activity by gangsters on criminal justice grounds, because the enterprise
restricted has a commercial angle.55
Although the Tenth Amendment expressly allocates residual legislative
power to the states, precedent is still firmly in place for reading the
amendment as imposing no substantive limitations on Congress&apos;s con-
tinuing wide-ranging power under the precedent already cited. Even after
Lopez, the amendment continues to be viewed, as a &quot;truism&quot; yielding no
more power to the states than whatever legitimate legislative power re-
mains, after Congress is accorded its full reach of power under Article 1.56
53 17 U.S. (4 wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).
54 Katzenbacb v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964).
55 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971).
56 The expression is from United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 - 24, 61 S. Ct. 451,
462, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941), and it continues to be applicable, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Autbority, 469 U.S. 528, 551, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1018, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1985),
r e h e a r i n g d e n i e d, 471 U.S. 1049, 105 S. Ct. 2041, 85 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1985), with the ca-
veat only that the Court has found that procedural restrictions under the Tenth Amend-
ment on the federal congress&apos;s ability to impose co-responsibility for its policies on state
legislatures. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120
(1992).
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The precise shift in congressional power wrought by Lopez does not lie
in any departure per se from reliance on the concept of commercial utility
to define the federal grant of power under the Commerce Clause. Both
the new and the older approach emphasize that the clause must be read in
&quot;economic&quot; terms. The alteration lies, rather, in a repudiation of the idea
that the Court can supplement the constitutional text to define Congress&apos;s
empowerment with comprehensive philosophical, or even logical coher-
ence, permitting a predictably expansive interpretation of Congress&apos;s
power.
According to the majority in Lopez, Congress is now to be confined to
a more functional interpretation of its powers, than it has been in recent
decades. They are to be viewed as no more than discrete grants of practi-
cal authority, unassimilable to any overall philosophical justification. The
point is to ensure that power is allocated between state and federal level
out of functional regard for the dynamics of power, rather than a coher-
ent philosophy differentiating kinds of governmental responsibility for
basic constitutional values.
To better grasp the rejected view, one needs merely to read the dissent-
ing opinions of the members of the Court who did not endorse the ma-
jority position.57 That alternative stance argued, in effect, that Congress
should be able to formulate overarching policies covering all dimensions
of national life under the Commerce Clause, on condition only that it
framed these policies in the idiom of economics. This minority position
would have allowed Congress to regulate teenagers carrying guns at local
schools for a raft of more immediative motives, as long as it did so within
an overall justificatory schema ultimately tracing the meaning of such
motives to the consequences of regulated activities for producing
wealth.5&apos; In this view, congressional action would exceed its constitu-
tional limit only where interests and values are inherently not susceptible
to economic reasoning, with such nonassimilable interests and values - if
any in fact exist - falling to the purview of the states.
Justice Kennedy&apos;s concurrence illumines deeper grounds for the
Court&apos;s stated assertion that a lack of textual support requires a rejection
of sixty years of precedent tending to support the minority position.
Kennedy argues that Rehnquist&apos;s interpretation of the text lies not
in the inherent meaning of concepts or of any stable realities to which
57 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651- 65, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 665 - 84.
58 115 S. Ct. at 1651, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 666 (S o u te r, J., dissenting) and 115 S. Ct. at 1660,
131 L. Ed. 2d at 677 (B r e y e r, J., dissenting).
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they correspond, but in the shifting requirements of preserving, in evolv-
ing circumstances, the balance of federal and state power, according to
what optimally serves individual liberty.59
Lopez is only the most recent, in a series of R e h n q u i s t Court cases
revising constitutional doctrines incrementally and across the board, for
the sake of tilting the balance of power back towards the stateS.60 In the
case at hand, the shift implies an option for the values of liberty and fair-
ness over the utility of a stronger central government, which was favored
by the Court&apos;s dissenters. Rehnquist&apos;s preference for the rule of law,
which he expresses in terms of fidelity to the text, over democracy, which
he conceives, in turn, as national legislative policyrnaking, is to be inter-
preted in these underlying terms. In adjudicating division-of-powers
questions through such pragmatic balancing, the Court aims at placing the
Federal Congress, the States, and even itself, in a functional equilibrium,
subject to periodic adjustments to ensure popular satisfaction with the
system&apos;s concrete realization of freedom, fairness, and efficiency.
III. Resolving Conflicts over the Scope of &quot;Public Morality&quot;:
The Abortion Controversy
A complementary route to understanding the distinct roles, which the
two constitutional systems accord basic values, leads via the protections
each grants individuals against invasions by state power. A particularly apt
matrix for this second line of analysis is formed by the adjudication of
conflicts between community assertions of moral norms and individual
inclinations to contravene the community standard. In both Germany and
America, the most aggravated recent controversy of this kind has been
over abortion.
The German Experience
The current response of the German Constitutional Court to the spe-
cific issue of abortion can be found in its Second Abortion opinion of
1993. The Court&apos;s Second Senate had been called upon in the case to re-
solve the constitutionality of a &quot;no-fault&quot; scheme the Federal Parliament
59 115 S. Ct. at 1660, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 677 (K e n n e d y, J., concurring).
60 An example is the area of procedural protections within the criminal justice system.
See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995).
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had adopted for regulating early abortion.61 The Court adopted the basic
value of the life of every human person as the starting point of its evalu-
ation of the enactment.62 On the facts, it found human life to be present
as a value from at least the implantation of the individuated embryo, the
earliest unborn entity affected by definition, under a law concerned with
the &quot;interruption&quot; of pregnancy. It held that killing the fetus even in early
abortion was a presumptive violation of the constitutional order.63
The Court examined the concrete context to determine whether a coun-
tervailing constitutional value might sufficiently limit the recognition
owed the right of life to allow it, nonetheless, to sustain the legislative
enactment. The Court could not find democracy to offer such a counter-
weight because, within the German constitutional order, that value is
itself accountable to the very human dignity at issue in the right to life
itself.64 But, it found that the pregnant woman&apos;s life, bodily health, and
autonomous development of personality were such a separate value
sufficient under circumstances at least, to limit the concrete recognition
constitutionally owed the right to life.65
Where the pregnant woman demonstrated objectively grave reasons
for interpreting the pregnancy as a threat to her life, physical health or the
development of her personality, the Court found the legality of abortion
compatible with a constitutional order vindicating the life of her unborn
child as an objective basic value.66 In such cases, therefore, abortion could
be considered justified and not constitutionally wrongful.
The Court held that a law permitting such abortions did not violate the
Constitution.67
61 Principally, §5 218 &amp; 219 of the Strafgesetzbucb as amended by the Gesetz. zum
Schutz des Vorgeburtlichen/werdenden Lebens, zur F6rderung einer Kinderfreundlicheren
Gesellscbaft, fiir Hilfen im Schwangerschaftskonflikt und zur Regelung des Schwanger-
schaftsabbruchs (Schwangeren- und Familienhilfegesetz) 1992 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBIJ I
1398 -1402. The legislature wanted to leave the decision to the woman&apos;s individual con-
science with an awareness of her responsibility, but without imposing objective limitations
on her reasoning. As such, the approach can be said to resemble the development in both
Germany and the United States of law permitting &quot;no-fault&quot; divorce, i.e. the legal recogni-
tion of the divorce decision without a showing of fault.
62 BVerfGE 88, 203, H (251).
63 Id. at 252, 255 - 56.
64 Protection of life was said by the Court to be the &quot;Aufgabe des Gesetzgebers&quot;, id. at
254.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 257.
67 More precisely, the Court&apos;s formulation was that, through &quot;Unzumutbarkeit&quot;, no
&quot;Rechtspflicht&quot; to carry the child to term was &quot;aufzuerlegen&quot; by the state. It took care to
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But such a law was not the precise point in controversy. That, rather,
was whether a permissive regime of abortion, allowing abortion based on
the early phase of gestation alone and without a showing of objective
reason, was constitutional. The Court&apos;s response to this question was that
where a woman could establish no objectively grave reason for interrupt-
ing the pregnancy, the abortion indefeasibly constituted a violation of the
right to life.68 The Federal Parliament was constitutionally obligated to
treat the act as objectively wrongful at German law.69 No loosening of
legal restrictions could go so far as to alter the juridical status of an objec-
tively unjustified abortion as an act wrongful within the constitutional
order of values. The Court, thus, held the law, as enacted, unconstitu-
tional.
The further question the Court addressed, critical to future parliamen-
tary efforts at abortion reform, was whether the constitutional obligation
to respect the right to life which the Court found incumbent on the
legislature required it to criminalize objectively unjustified, early-term
abortions, or whether it left open the milder path of a program of &quot;pub-
lic morality&quot; employing means other than criminal sanctionS.70 The Court
stipulated that to be acceptable any future legislative response to abortion
must safeguard the minimum inviolable content of the basic value of indi-
vidual human life.71 It held further that this minimum called for some-
say that this concept did not qualify the general maternal duty of care for a child, nor did
it relieve the state of an own ongoing duty of its own to the child, holding this latter duty
to be properly expressed by state assistance to the mother to ensure that the child, if at all
possible, reach term, id. at 255 - 56, 259, 261. The Court noted the possibility of notions of
moral or religious duty to the unborn child which might be perceived by the individual as
requiring the carrying the child to term, notwithstanding the absence of a exactable legal
duty to do so, id. at 257.
68 Id.; the Court also held that it violated the &quot;Sozialstaatprinzip&quot;, id. at 319.
69 The Court held a no-fault regime in which &quot;die Rechtspflicht zum Austragen des
Kindes von Grundrechts wegen auch nur für eine bestimmte Zeit - generell aufgehoben
ware&quot; constitutionally inadmissible, id. at 255, on the ground that the admission of the act
as &quot;nicht rechtswidrig&quot; would compromise the integrity of the entire &quot;Rechtsordnung&quot;, id.
at 241. In their dissent, justices Mahrenholz and Sommer argued that the majority was
pursuing a distinction without a difference, &quot;ob [das Gesetz] den Tatbestand einengte
oder ob er einen Rechtfertigungsgrund setzte oder nur einen Schuld- oder Straf-
ausschließungsgrund zum Inhalt hatte; in jedem Falle müsse der Eindruck entstehen, der
Abbruch sel&apos;rechtlich erlaubt&apos; id. 356.
70 The Court held that criminal sanctions had to remain an &quot;ultima ratio&quot; in the legal
order, but need not be used in every circumstance, id. at 253, 258.
71 Id. at 254.
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thing more than simply validating that value as an abstract juridical
matter: namely, it required as effective as possible a protection of the sub-
jective right to life of all unborn children threatened with abortion.72
The Court examined the facts of abortion to determine what minimum
concrete legal devices would both adequately safeguard the individual
human lives placed at risk by abortion and properly uphold unjustified
abortion status as constitutionally wrongful. Where the former require-
ment was concerned, the Court ascertained that circumstances inherently
relating to early pregnancy and abortion historically had made criminal
sanctions ineffective in eliminating abortion.73 The Court took notice as
well of empirical arguments that counselling and social support for preg-
nant women were more useful than criminal sanction in lowering the
abortion rate.74 It concluded that, where certain conditions were satisfied,
a counselling and social support schema could be a constitutional alterna-
tive to criminalizing early-phase abortion.75
A first condition was that the scheme&apos;s counselling component aim at
more than merely a decrease in the frequency of unjustified abortion. The
Court stipulated that such counselling must educate the woman consider-
ing unjustified abortion concerning its wrongful character and the desir-
ability, where countervailing reasons are not objectively present, of con-
tinuing pregnancy to term.76 The requirement flowed from the Court&apos;s
judgement that the constitutional order was capable of absorbing decrim-
inalization of early abortion in essential part, only by relying on the mor-
al dignity of the mother&apos;s decision, as a separate, objective constitutional
value.77 The legislature could employ counselling as a response to abor-
tion, therefore, only where it observed the objective requirements of
genuinely ethical reasoning.78
72 id. at 251 and 261.
73 Id. at 263 - 66.
74 Notably, outsiders could not perceive that the woman was pregnant in the early phase
of pregnancy, 1d. at 266.
75 Id. at 264 - 65. In this key conclusion, the Court departed from its conclusion in its
1975 abortion decision that the criminalization of unjustified abortion was required,
BVerfGE 39, 1, 46 - 47, and adopted a position which in some ways resembled the outlines
of justice R u p p - v o n B r ii n n e c k&apos;s 1975 dissent, id. at 79 (dissenting opinion).
76 Id. at 270 and 276.
77 Id. 272.
78 Id. at 281.
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A second condition of constitutionality, arising from the same consid-
eration, was that any legal permission of objectively unjustified abortions
occur only with provision made for winnowing out applications made
from external pressure, rather than internal decision.79 The Court, thus,
held that the state was required to assure the woman of adequate social
support on the birth of her baby.80 Procedures had to be developed to
protect her from undergoing abortion to satisfy third-party pressure.81
Finally, the Court stipulated that the preservation, which it mandated,82
of the juridical status of unjustified abortion as constitutionally wrongful
even where legally allowed was incompatible with the subsidy of unjusti-
fied abortion from insurance funds pooled for health, since such payment
would necessarily imply that the procedure objectively advanced life or
health.83 In a related restriction, the Court held that the medical profes-
sion could constitutionally perform unjustified abortions only within a
framework of professional ethics grounded in principled adherence to the
value of each individual human life from at least the time of implanta-
tion.84
The Court tailored its holding to interfere no more in the interests of
pregnant women than actually necessary to advance constitutional values,
holding, for instance, that the dignity of women undergoing abortions
merited confidentiality without regard to the constitutionally justified or
unjustified character of their actions.85 Similarly, it stipulated that the
legislature could, without constitutional offense, pay the costs of poor
women&apos;s unjustified abortions, if it drew on social insurance set aside for
guaranteeing a minimum living standard rather than from health-pooled
funds, since the former implied support only for the woman&apos;s subsistence,
not the objective rightfulness of her act.86
79 Id. at 296 - 97.
80 id. at 259.
81 Id. at 253 and 260.
132 id. at 273.
83 Id. at 315; the Court held, by contrast, that medical contracts arising in the context
of constitutionally unjustified abortions could be enforced, without compromising the le-
gal system&apos;s fidelity to the value of human life, conditional only on the exclusion of dam-
ages for &quot;wrongful life&quot; claims, id. at 295 - 96.
84 See generally id. at 289 - 96. The Court&apos;s term was &quot;arztlich verantwortbar&quot;, id. at
292. The Court stated that one specific duty was to withhold information identifying the
gender of unborn children, unless medically necessary, to prevent gender-specific abortions.
It also held that physicians had a constitutional right of conscientious objection to perform-
ing abortions, id. at 294.
85 Id. at 317.
86 Id.
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The realization of basic values the Court intended through its decision
included the protection in fact, wherever possible, of existing unborn lives
from the killing of abortion; the moral integrity of physicians and family
counsellors; and, ultimately, a commitment to, and defense of, life&apos;s value
on the broadest possible societal basis. The decision had structural conse-
quences for the allocation of responsibility for realizing the value of indi-
vidual life, for it allowed the legislature to shift such responsibility from
governmental organs charged with criminal justice, to ones concerned
with social welfare, and, to a not insignificant degree, from government it-
self, to society in all its reaches. As the realization of the latter develop-
ment, the Court envisioned intermediate social institutions with social
service credentials engaged in counselling,87 and, through the levy of tax
revenues, the whole population mobilized in support of counselling and
social services fostering respect for jife.
The Federal Parliament had judged national unity to warrant a loosen-
ing of abortion restrictions in the wake of increased moral pluralism fol-
lowing the incorporation of the Ldnder of the former Soviet Zone.88 In its
1993 Abortion decision, the Constitutional Court demanded a more nu-
anced legislative judgement. It validated the legislature&apos;s search for new
and different strategies in further national unity on changing facts, but it
would not concede the legislature authority to come to such unity by ob-
jectively abandoning a core constitutional value. Common respect for ob-
Jective values as fundament of German national identity was foremost
among the values the Court sought to realize.89
The American Experience
A comparison of the role American constitutional interpretation assigns
basic values in adjudicating conflicts&apos;between legislatures and individuals
over public morality, more specifically, about abortion, relies most appro-
priately on the United States Supreme Courts 1992 opinion in Casey v.
87 Id. at 304, 261.
88 Id. at 219. The issue had been left open in the Unification Treaty. Einigungsvertrag,
Aug. 31, 1990, art. 31(4). 104 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesreglerung Bulletin
877 (1990); Peter H. M e r k 1, German Unification in the European Context 176 - 80
(1993).
89 On August 21, 1995, the Federal Parliament enacted legislation implementing the
reasoning of the Constitutional Court analyzed here, Schwangeren- und FamilienhiffeHnde-
rungsgesetz, 1995 BGBL 1050 -1057.
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Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania. The case reviewed the
constitutionality of state of Pennsylvania&apos;s law on abortion.90
As in Germany, the issue before the Court was whether a legislative
construal of abortion as a question of public morality was constitutional.
But the American court&apos;s more specific formulation effected a dramatic
reversal. It phrased the problem as whether the legislature may treat abor-
tion as a concern in public morality, in contrast to a &quot;no-fault&quot; exercise of
freedom, guaranteed by the Constitution.91
justice O&apos;Connor&apos;s plurality opinion in support of Casey&apos;s holding
adopted 14th Amendment liberty as its starting point.92 More concretely,
it found that this concept had a twofold relevant meaning: &quot;liberty relat-
ing to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or
not to beget or bear a child and bodily integrity&quot;;93 and freedom from
governmental coercion in decisions over &quot;medical treatment&quot;.94
O&apos;Connor proposed both as broad enough to embrace a woman&apos;s
decision to abort, but noted that, should the recognized scope of such
freedoms be considered too narrow for the purpose, Roe v. Wade95 was,
as a matter of stare decists alone, sufficient to sustain that right.
Caught in the skeins of obvious doubt arising from her personal judi-
cial philosophy over the inclusion of abortion within the meaning of four-
teenth amendment liberty, O&apos;Connor was found to assert that a single
precedent assured abortion of constitutional protection sans the further
grounding that might be found lacking in history or reason.96 The
precedent&apos;s unique force in this regard was, in any event, stated by
O&apos;C o n n o r to be a double one. Roe had resolved an intense public
dispute over a controverted value, and American women had relied upon
it in since arranging their economic livelihoods.97
90 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1992) (ruling on 18 Pa. Cons.Stat.
SS 3203 - 3220 [1990]). At the time of the writing of this article, the official United States
Reports version of the case was not yet available to the author and so pinpoint citations to
that source are not provided.
91 112 S. Ct. at 2816, 120 L. Ed. at 709.
92 112 S. Ct. at 2804, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 695.
93 112 S. Ct. at 2810,120 L. Ed. 2d at 702 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 [1965]).
94 112 S. Ct. at 2810, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 702 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Healtb, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 [1990]).
95 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
96 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810 -16, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 701- 709.
97 112 S. Ct. at 2809, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 701; the general test for the force of precedent
which the Court set out was phrased in terms of &quot;unworkability&quot;, &quot;anachronism&quot;, and
.change in premise of fact&quot;. 112 S. Ct. at 2816, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 709.
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The Court found the 14th Amendment liberty guarantee to confer the
right to terminate a pregancy.98 The Pennsylvania law had with respect to
most of the term of pregnancy not prohibited abortion, but merely sub-
jected it to regulation as a matter of public morality, seeking indirectly
thereby to encourage a reduction in the abortion rate.99 The critical issue
was whether the burdens this scheme imposed on women seeking abor-
tions violated the Constitution.
O&apos;Connor inquired whether a countervailing value existed sufficient
to justify limiting the abortion right to the extent of the Pennsylvania stat-
ute. She found such a value, at least potentially, in democratic decisions
over matters of legitimate societal interest.100 More specifically, she found
the life of the child to constitute such an interest and, thus, to be a poten-
tial basis for limiting abortion. Where the fetus was &quot;viable&quot;, currently for
about the last three months of pregnancy, she observed that this interest
was sufficiently weighty to justify prohibiting abortion, at least where no
countervailing material maternal interest in life or health could be shown
to militate in favor of the procedure.101
Where the fetus was &quot;nonviable&quot;, currently for about the first six
months of pregnancy, the plurality asserted that the State&apos;s interest in the
child was too light to justify proscribing even elective abortions, but suf-
ficiently weighty to support indirect burdens on the exercise of the right
of abortion through a scheme regulatory of public morality.102 On this
critical point, Casey overturned the specific holding of Roe v. Wade.
98 Id.
99 112 S. Ct. at 2803, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 693 - 94.
100 112 S. Ct. at 2817, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 710. The American decision assumes that the un-
born child or fetus has no constitutional right to state protection, and it inquires merely the
scope of the legislature&apos;s perogative to confer such protection. Gerald Neuman has
pointed out that the salient distinction between the German and American abortion deci-
sions can be generalized beyond the right of the unborn child or fetus to state protection.
He notes that the deeper issue is whether the recognition of rights extend to protection
from private third-party interference. Gerald L. N e u m a n, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion,
Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 American journal
of Comparative Law 273, 295 - 314 (1995) [hereinafter Am. J. Comp. L.J. N e u m a n con-
trasts the German approach with DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services,
489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct.998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), in which the United States Supreme
Court held that a 4-year-old boy threatened with violence, known to the state, by an adult
caretaker had no right to protective state intervention. For contrasting German law, see the
&quot;Drittwirkung&quot; doctrine. Peter E. Q u i n t, Free Speech and Private Law in German Con-
stitutional Theory, 48 Maryland Law Review 247, 339 - 47 (1989).
101 112 S. Ct. at 2816
-17, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 710.
102 112 S. Ct. at 2818, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 712.
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State power to advance an interest in the nonviable fetus during the first
two-thirds of pregnancy, moreover, reached its limit, according to
O&apos;Connor, at a threshold considerably lower than attempts at outright
proscription. That point was said by O&apos;C o n n o r to be encountered in
.any substantial obstacle&quot; to the procurement, in fact, of an abortion.
Such was the essence of the Court&apos;s new &quot;undue burden&quot; test.103
Within the limit of &quot;no undue burden&quot;, the plurality upheld all of
Pennsylvania&apos;s regulations aimed at informing the woman of the state&apos;s
preference for childbirth over abortion, and at making sure that her deci-
sion was both reasonably well considered and duly informed of the objec-
tive physiological characteristics of her unborn offspring at the time pro-
posed for its abortion.104 The Court struck down only one term in the
law, which imposed a conditional duty on married women to attest that
they had notified their husbands of their intention to abort. The ground
was the undue burden the Court perceived in an implicit invitation to
third-party pressure before the procedure, and to physical or moral retal-
iation after it.105
Both the plurality&apos;s practical purpose, and the holding&apos;s immediate
effect, were to give greater legislative scope to expressions of disapproval
of abortion and to efforts at a reduction in its incidence, without, how-
ever, the disruption of national unity which would have flowed from per-
mitting individual states to adopt conflicting hierarchies of abstract value.
The plurality&apos;s methodology in reaching its result had meaning for the
American constitutional framework, however, that went beyond its con-
crete goals.
Significantly, the relatively traditionalist justices joining in
O&apos;Connor&apos;s opinion were unwilling to limit the extratextual sources
of fourteenth-amendment liberty to traditions or concepts validated
within the history of American and English law and jurisprudence in the
once familiar manner of a Harlan or Frankfurter, and ranged instead into
the still relatively novel realm of concepts of bodily autonomy and of the
value-creating capacity of judicial will.
Significantly, too, these same justices chose to limit the authority of the
state - not federal - legislature to advance moral or metaphysical concepts
of value, as opposed to material interests. An ancillary value of the dem-
ocratic decisions of American state legislatures has long been their perpet-
103 112 S. Ct. at 2819, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 712 -13.
104 112 S. Ct. at 2822 - 26, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 717 - 21.
105 112 S. Ct. at 2826 - 3 1, and 120 L. Ed. 2d at 721- 28.
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uation of ancient equitable and moral principles embedded in the states&apos;
common-law traditions, traditions previously enriching and offsetting the
functional or utilitarian modes of justification the Constitution requires of
the legislature at the federal level.
The Casey plurality&apos;s interpretations both of the meaning of individual
liberty and democratic decision represent a constriction of the kinds of
reasons counting as rational, within the American constitutional scheme.
When one seeks the deeper ground, one confronts a concern with the
balance of power, similar to that seen in Lopez.
If Casey had held the reverse, and permitted states to permit or pro-
scribe abortion according to majority will, a serious clash of modes of
rationality and moral reasoning among states might have been feared, even
to the point of jeopardizing the nation&apos;s unity. justice Kennedy&apos;s con-
currence in Lopez suggested that the Court&apos;s textual interpretations might
hinge on a pragmatic assessment of the balance of power in the federal
scheme. Casey can fairly be read as standing for the same proposition. Its
resolution of the issues before it facially allocated power between the
individual and the state, but, on another level, it aimed at a desired balance
of national unity and local independence. Its contribution to this project
was its prescription of utility and individualism106 as the language at the
state as well, as at the national level, for resolving divisive moral topics.
IV Concluding Reflections
The materials reviewed here have been current Ones, but the pictures
emerging resonate with deepseated traditional differences between the
legal cultures which are in view: one system - anglo-saxon, process-
oriented, pragmatic, and individualistic; another - continental, substan-
tive, communitarian, and principled. Evaluating the realization of basic
values within each system requires that German and American solutions
to particular problems be considered only against the backdrop of appre-
ciation for differences in national constitutional languages.
In both systems, the interpretation of basic values relies on a prudential
judgement to close the gap between constitutional concepts and their
106 The plurality justified the Court&apos;s holding on the individualist ground that &quot;[a]t the
heart of liberty is the right to define one&apos;s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the state&quot;, 112 S.
Ct. at 2807, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
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requirements in new and changing situations.107 In the German system,
this judgement principally matches the material content of new situations
with the forms of inherited concepts, but, as both German cases have
shown, it extends also to an ancillary process of creating new structural
relationships within government and society. In the American system, the
judgement in question goes primarily to allocating freedom and power,
but, as we have seen from the cases considered, it requires, as well, an-
guishing over and, as could be developed in a more extensive review of
American case law, in its own fashion, affirming the source, nature, and
direction of basic values.
The right prudential judgement in each system, then, involves the same
elements but in a different order. Common to both systems is the over-
arching requirement that the judgement linking the formal constitutional
value and its realization in fact combine the due degree of closure and
openness.108 If an evalution were to be undertaken of the cases considered
here, or of the tendencies they expose in their respective interpretive tra-
ditions, it would c&apos;enter on the correctness of this prudential balance.
Specifically, one might ask whether the American opinions find the best
balance between pragmatic openness to uniting the country around an na-
tional market and closure in relation to norms of integrity in interpretive
and moral reasoning. Of the German cases and their interpretive tradition,
one might inquire into the source of German assurance of striking the
right balance between closure represented by commitment to jurispruden-
tial norms and values and openness to a future defined by rapidly inte-
grating economic markets relativizing and flattening the European moral
and cultural traditions on which the German interpretative tradition un-
doubtedly depends.
107 The two systems can find common ground, not only in hermeneutical methodology,
but also in concrete social and political problems calling for resolution: &quot;Despite differing
historical legacies and cultural settings, the liberal democracies are wrestling with
certain common problems&quot;, Mary Ann Glendon, General Report - Individualism and
Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993
Brigham Young University Law Review 385, 412.
108 Winfried B r u g g e r describes this tension as being one of &quot;Flexibilitat&quot; and
&quot;Rigidität.&quot; Winfried B r u g g e r, Konkretisierung des Rechts und Auslegung der Gesetze,
119 Archiv des 6ffentlichen Rechts 16 (1994); for a general schema of possibilities of
hermeneutical methodology, see Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of
jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some Remarks From a German Point of View, 42 Am.
J. Comp. Law 395 - 421 (1994).
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Rather than to presume to include such a substantive evaluation within
its scope, the present article will conclude with a question which, it is
hoped, will stimulate further reflection on the meaning and direction of
the evaluation called for. The German and American abortion cases sup-
port legislative schemes remarkably similar&apos;09 in their legal permissions,
prohibitions and commands regarding the act of abortion, and, yet, they
give virtually opposing accounts of the jurisprudential meaning of the
countries&apos; respective laws - What is one to make of this? What does it
portend for the future?
109 The pattern of similarity and difference between the two legal regimes on the
question of abortion should not be oversimplified. Similarity extends, for example, beyond
the positive scope conferred on the freedom of abortion to a common judicial willingness
to intervene in the democratic resolution of the question. And difference goes beyond the
divergent moral interpretations the respective national courts give to freedom of abortion.
A critical difference in the permission legally conferred lies in the far more restrictive time
limit imposed on abortion in Germany. German law gives far greater protection to the child
developing in utero by restricting abortion to a time far ealier in pregnancy. The judicially
imposed American solution is more permissive than was even the legislation seeking to
accomodate a newly integrated population accustomed to abortion on demand in commu-
nist East Germany, which the German Court overturned. The American regime appears
unique in its willingness to guarantee the availability of the abortion procedure so far into
pregnancy. Mary Ann Glendon, U.S. Abortion Law: Still the Most Permissive on Earth,
Wall Street journal, July 1, 1992, at A 15.
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